U.S. state policies for renewable energy : context and effectiveness by Delmas, Magali & Montes, María J.
Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2273–2288Contents lists available at ScienceDirectEnergy Policyjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpolU.S. state policies for renewable energy: Context and effectiveness$
Magali A. Delmas a,n, Maria J. Montes-Sancho b
a UCLA Institute of the Environment and Sustainability and Anderson School of Management La Kretz Hall, Suite 300, Los Angeles, CA 93106-5131, United States
b Department of Business Administration, Carlos III University, Madrid, SpainKeywords:
Policy effectiveness
Climate change
Renewable energy1. Introduction
Addressing climate change has b
for the U.S. administration. In the U
0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsev
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.01.034
the U.S. non-hydro renewable generation.
renewables/page/non_hydro/nonhydrorenew
3 EIA, 2009. International Energy Stati
international/electricitycapacity.html.
4 ‘‘Europe’s Energy Portal.’’ http://www.a b s t r a c t
Over the past decade, state policies on renewable energy have been on the rise in the U.S., providing
states with various options for encouraging the generation of renewable electricity. Two promising
policies, the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and the Mandatory Green Power Option (MGPO), have
been implemented in many states but the evidence about their effectiveness is mixed. In this paper, we
argue that recognizing the natural, social, and policy context under which MGPO and RPS are adopted is
necessary in order to measure their true effectiveness. This is because the context rather than the policy
might lead to positive outcomes and there is the possibility for sample bias. When controlling for the
context in which the policies are implemented, we find that RPS has a negative impact on investments
in renewable capacity. However, we find that investor owned utilities seem to respond more positively
to RPS mandates than publicly owned utilities. By contrast, MGPO appears to have a significant effect
on installed renewable capacity for all utilities regardless of the context in which it is implemented.ecome an important priority
.S., greenhouse gas emissions
While there are current debates about the implementation of a
federal renewable policy, U.S. states have taken a leading role in
establishing renewable energy policies since the late 1990s. These
include Renewable Portfolio Standards, the requirement to sell
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hacome primarily from the combustion of fossil fuels in energy use.
Energy related carbon dioxide emissions, resulting from the
combustion of petroleum, coal, and natural gas, represented 82%
of total U.S. anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in 2006.1
While the U.S. generates 3% of its electricity from renewable
resources,2 other developed countries such as Denmark, Germany,
Spain, and New Zealand generate 25%, 20%, 16%, and 8% of their
electricity from renewables, respectively.3 In addition, all of the
European Union member states have aggressive renewable
energy percentages they plan to reach by 2020, while the U.S.
has no federally defined targets for renewable generation.4
$We thank Carley Markovitz for her exceptional research assistance with this
project.
n Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 310 825 9310.
E-mail addresses: delmas@ucla.edu (M.A. Delmas),
mmontes@emp.uc3m.es (M.J. Montes-Sancho).
1 http://www.eia.doe.gov/bookshelf/brochures/greenhouse/Chapter1.htm.
2 This is without hydroelectricity. Biomass (71%) was the predominant non-
hydro renewable fuel for electricity generation in 2003, followed by geothermal
and wind. Solar thermal and photovoltaics together accounted for less than 1% ofco
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stics. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
energy.eu/#renewable.en products, disclosure policies, and subsidies. Analyzing the
ectiveness of state renewable policies can be helpful to inform
current policy debate at the federal level.
Recent research has started to look at the effectiveness of state
licies on the generation of renewable electricity but has found
xed results. While some studies have found positive results
rd et al., 2005; Delmas et al., 2010; Menz and Vachon,
06; Zarnikau, 2003; Yin and Powers, 2010), others have found
significant results (Carley, 2009).
Furthermore, most of these studies provide little information
the natural and institutional conditions under which state
ewable policies are adopted, which could have an impact on
ir effectiveness. For example, the relationship between
talled renewable capacity and a state’s resource endowment
g., sun, biomass, or wind) is unclear with some studies finding
gative correlations (Carley, 2009). There is also little informa
n on how the institutional context facilitates the effectiveness
renewable policies. Without taking into account the natural
d institutional context we might falsely attribute effectiveness
the policy. It is possible that investments in renewables could
ve happened in the absence of the policy just because the
ntext was favorable. In addition, differences in policy effective
ss might vary according to the type of electric utilities that are
bjected to these policies as electric utilities investing in renew
le capacity have different governance structures. Some of them
1
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that these differences might explain disparities in responses to
state policies.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of two major and related
policies on the capacity of renewable energy: Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPS) and Mandatory Green Power Options (MGPO),
which request electric utilities to source or sell specific percen
tages of renewable energy. Our analysis differs significantly from
previous research. First, we integrate in our model state and
electric utility characteristics to understand both the context of
adoption and effectiveness of state renewable policies. Second, we
analyze capacity development rather than changes in the percen
tage of total generation from renewables as this provides a better
indication of changes in the renewable infrastructure.
Overall, our results indicate that different renewable policies
have different effects on the development of renewable capacity.
As hypothesized, Green product requirements are found to be
more effective than RPS. Our findings also indicate the importance
of modeling the factors that trigger policy adoption to analyze
policy effectiveness. When modeling such factors, the effect of
RPS on renewable capacity becomes negative and significant,
while it was insignificant with the previous methodologies used
in the literature. In addition, we find that different types of utility
react differently to the policies. For example, RPS seems to be
more effective at getting investor owned utilities to invest in
renewable capacity as compared to publicly owned utilities.
This paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we
review state renewable policies and the literature on their
effectiveness. In Section 2 we present our empirical analysis
based on the analysis of the strategies of 650 U.S. utilities from
1998 to 2007. In Section 3 we describe our results. A concluding
discussion follows.
2. State renewable energy policiesRenewable state energy policies are usually grouped into two
Overall, the research conducted on the effectiveness of RPS has
either completely exempt renewable electricity sources from property taxes, or
implement a price reduction for green electricity in residential, commercial, or
industrial buildings (Menz, 2005).
2categories. The first category provides financial incentives to
encourage renewable energy. These include tax incentives, grants,
loans, rebates, and production incentives (Menz and Vachon,
2006). The second category contains rules and regulations, which
mandate a certain action from an obligated entity. Included
within this category are Renewable Portfolio Standards, Manda
tory Green Power Options, and fuel disclosure rules (Menz and
Vachon, 2006). In 2007, all but three states (Alabama, Alaska, and
Mississippi) had implemented at least one of these policies, and
four states (Colorado, Iowa, Oregon, and Washington) had estab
lished all four policies (see Table A1 in the Appendix). While each
of these renewable energy policies has its own implications and
may deserve additional analysis, this paper will focus primarily
on two policies requiring electric utilities to source or sell
renewable energy: Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and
Mandatory Green Power Options (MGPO).
The concept of a renewable portfolio standard dates back to
1983, the year when the first RPS policy was enacted in Iowa
(Wiser et al., 2007; Wiser and Barbose, 2008). RPS requires
electricity providers in those states to source an increase in
amount of renewable energy in a specified timeframe (Vachon
and Menz, 2006). The majority of states give their electric utility
providers the option of generating electricity from renewable
resources themselves, and/or exchanging renewable energy cred
its (RECs) or renewable energy certificates, in order to meet RPS
mandates (Carley, 2009). The amount of renewable energy a
utility is required to provide from renewable resources can be
measured in absolute units (KW or KWh) or as a percentage of
total retail sales (Wiser et al., 2007). In the state of Oregon, RPSrequires that large utilities supply 25% of electricity from renew
able resources by 2025, whereas smaller utilities must provide
between 5% and 10% by 2025.5
The Mandatory Green Power Option (MGPO) requires electri
city suppliers to provide an option for their customers to purchase
green power either directly from their electric company or from
an alternative provider (Menz, 2005). The electric companies have
the option of generating renewable energy themselves, purchas
ing green power from an alternative producer, or buying renew
able energy credits from their state’s public utilities commission
(Menz and Vachon, 2006). MGPO represents a more recent option
than RPS and has been adopted by six states.
In addition to RPS and MGPO, tax incentives and fuel dis
closure programs are popular approaches used by state govern
ments to increase renewable energy production. Sixteen states
employ corporate income tax credits for solar and wind invest
ments, as well as for the utilization of green electricity (Menz,
2005).6 Currently established in 24 states, disclosure programs
impose requirements upon companies to impart information on
the fuel sources used to produce the electricity they provide
directly to their customers (Delmas et al., 2010). For example, the
Minnesota disclosure program requires electric utilities to submit
biannual reports that contain a pie chart depicting the mix of fuel
sources, a bar chart of air pollutant emissions, a chart of costs
associated with different generating sources, and a discussion of
energy efficiency measures (Delmas et al., 2010). Essentially,
disclosure programs are implemented with the intention of
increasing consumer awareness of the inner workings of their
electric companies, with the hope that elevated knowledge will
ignite more thoughtful decision making on the part of the
consumer.
3. Literature reviewfound mixed results. For example, Carley (2009) found that RPS
was not significant as an effective state renewable energy
policy. Delmas et al. (2007) also reported that RPS was not
significant in impacting renewable generation. On the other
hand, Menz and Vachon (2006) concluded that RPS had a
significant and positive impact on wind capacity and Yin and
Powers (2010) also concluded that RPS was a positive effect on
the development of renewable capacity. While these studies
report differing results, it is important to recognize that they
used different dependent variables: generation of renewable
energy, and wind and renewable capacity. The effect of RPS on
the generation of renewable energy was not significant, whereas
its effect on wind capacity and renewable capacity was positive
and significant.
Because MGPO is a more recent policy, there are fewer
empirical studies on its effectiveness. Menz and Vachon (2006)
found that Mandatory Green Power initiatives have a positive and
significant impact on the development of wind capacity in electric
utilities’ fuel mix ratios. Yin and Powers (2010) report the same
results on electric generation capacity.
The results of the research on the effect of other renewable
policies such as financial incentives are mixed. Carley (2009)
5 Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). http://
www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=OR22R&re=1&ee=1.
6 In addition, 14 states implement a sales tax exemption on solar photovoltaic,
wind energy, and other renewable energy equipment. Twenty-six states also
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3found that subsidies have a positive and significant correlation
with the generation of renewable energy, while tax incentives
have a negative and significant correlation. Menz and Vachon
(2006) found that Public Benefits funds (PBF) were not significant
to predict wind capacity at state. Delmas et al. (2010) report that
financial incentives, specifically tax incentives, have no effect
upon the fuel mix ratios of electric utilities. Menz and Vachon
(2006), as well as Bird et al. (2005), found financial incentives to
be insignificant in enhancing wind power capacity. Disclosure
policies are found to be more positive at encouraging renewable
energy. Delmas et al. (2010) found that mandatory disclosure
programs have a positive and significant effect upon a firm’s
generated fuel mix: the existence of mandatory disclosure pro
grams increases the amount of renewable sources provided by
electric utilities, and decreases the amount of fossil fuel sources.
This is consistent with the analyses of Green Power Demand,
undertaken by Zarnikau (2003) and Roe et al. (2001), who
conclude that disclosure policies have a positive and significant
impact on consumers’ willingness to pay for green power.
The variance in the data thus far accumulated on the efficacy
of renewable energy policies produces an inconclusive overall
picture. We argue that the current literature suffers from a
methodological weakness because most studies do not control
for what is called a potential ‘‘sample selection,’’ a type of bias
caused by choosing non random data for statistical analysis.
Indeed, the decision to adopt a renewable policy, such as RPS,
and investments in renewable capacity is likely to be influenced
by the same factors. In other words, there might be a sample bias
in that the reason why a policy is adopted might be related to its
success. Self selection makes it difficult to determine causation.
For example, one might note significantly higher capacity invest
ments among those states that have adopted renewable policies,
and credit the policies for the difference. However, due to self
selection, there are a number of differences between states that
have adopted policies and states that have not. Arguably, those
that adopted policies might have been better endowed in renew
able resources or might have had more highly motivated policy
makers than those that did not, and such differences in resources
and dedication may have affected investments in renewables in
the two groups. If such was the case, then it is not meaningful to
simply compare the two sets of scores.
Research in related fields found that such sample selection
problems were present in studying the effectiveness of voluntary
policy programs (Anton et al., 2004; Delmas and Montes, 2010;
Khanna and Damon, 1999; Rivera, 2002; Rivera and DeLeon,
2004). While several papers have analyzed the drivers of the
adoption of state renewable policies (Lyon and Yin, 2010; Vachon
and Menz, 2006), these papers did not relate the factors that
explain the adoption of renewable policies to the effectiveness of
the policies. For example, Vachon and Menz (2006) found that
social and political interests were positively linked to the adop
tion of green electricity policies while the renewable potential
(measured as the percent of sales that can be provided from
renewable resources) was not significant. Lyon and Yin (2010)
focused on RPS and found that states with poor air quality, strong
democratic presence, organized renewable developers, and strong
wind potential were more likely to adopt an RPS.
In this paper, we propose to use a different estimation model
than those used previously, in order to determine simultaneously
the adoption of RPS at the state level and the determinants of a
firm’s decision to invest in renewable capacity. In this, we build
on research that was conducted in the policy and management
field (Green et al., 1996; Delmas and Tokat, 2005; Delmas and
Montes, 2010; Khanna and Damon, 1999; King and Lenox, 2000;
Rivera, 2002; Rivera and DeLeon, 2004; Vandenberghe and Robin,
2004;Welch et al., 2000).In addition, most studies in the literature focused primarily on
e generation of renewables rather than investments in renew
le capacity. With only one exception (Yin and Powers, 2010),
ose that did focus on capacity focused exclusively on wind (Bird
al., 2005; Menz and Vachon, 2006) rather than on total
newable capacity. While relatively small portfolio shifts are
sily obtainable by altering capacity utilization, purchasing or
ilding new facilities may be required to dramatically alter fuel
ix portfolios. The majority of the current literature, by focusing
renewable generation, might analyze changes in capacity
ilization rather than shifts in capacity. In our paper, we focus
the effect of renewable energy policies on the building of
ergy infrastructure, which will be critical for the development
green power in the future. Evidence shows that several serious
stacles impede the building of new capacity, including financial
gulations and the acquisition of permits. Indeed, according to
&E’s Jennifer Zerwer, ‘‘It’s difficult to project [renewable
pacity] given the unknowns of permitting, financial, technolo
cal and transmission capacity issues.’’7 We believe that by
alyzing renewable capacity rather than renewable generation,
r paper will be able to take into account such obstacles to
aluate the effectiveness of policies on the renewable
frastructure.
In addition, the majority of the discussed papers analyzed the
option of renewable energy at the state level rather than
alyzing firm level strategies. Our approach therefore also differs
om these papers as we examine how differentiated utilities,
ther public or privately owned, respond to renewable energy
licies by increasing renewable capacity.
In conclusion, the literature has found mixed results regarding
e effectiveness of renewable policies and suffers from several
itations. First, the studies do not control for potential sample
lection and do not model the decision making process of
opting the policy to understand its effectiveness. Second, most
udies use as a measure of effectiveness generation of electricity
om renewable energy rather than installed capacity. Finally the
alyses are done mostly at the state level rather than at the firm
vel, and to not identify how different types of utilities respond
these policies, as policy effectiveness might vary accordingly.
Hypothesestween RPS and MGPO because of the difference in the design
these two policies. Second, because electric utilities have
fferent governance structures, we should also expect a different
pact of renewables policies upon publicly owned utilities than
privately owned ones. Third, in analyzing renewable capacity
ther than renewable generation, we should expect that the
tural and institutional conditions under which a policy is put
to place will have an impact on the effectiveness of the policy.
1. RPS and MGPO
Renewable Portfolio Standards have been implemented in
ore than half of the states in the U.S. and many regions of the
orld, and different terms have been used to define it. For
ample, in the UK, it is called ‘‘Obligation’’ and in Denmark
uota Obligation.’’ The main idea is that the electricity portfolio
electric utilities must include a specific percentage of power
nerated from renewables. Although RPS has been described in
7 Sullivan, Colin. ‘‘Renewable Energy: Calif. utilities still hunting for power to
eet RPS.’’ Contra Costa Times 30 June 2009. LexisNexis. Web.
11 http://www.epa.gov/grnpower/toplists/top50.htm.
12 ‘‘Values and Actions: Green Mission.’’ Whole Foods Market. http://www.
wholefoodsmarket.com/values/green-mission.php.
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renewable energy targets because it does not mandate a specific
allocation of government money (Solsky and Bielenberg, 2004;
Wiser et al., 2007), RPS in fact resembles a command and control
policy where the regulator requires the producer to adopt a
specific technology. In other words, RPS focuses on the use of a
specific technology rather than directly addressing emissions and
focuses on increase in supply rather than demand.
Because RPS lacks a market dimension, implementation and
enforcement of the policy is a key component of its potential
success. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) have emphasized the
importance of the policy implementation process as key to policy
success. Some elements identified by Pressman and
Wildavsky (1973), which can lead to delaying implementation,
include the number and variety of participants at each decision
point, the preference of the participants, and how it evolves over
time. In the case of RPS, it is possible that the political gains of
adopting the policy were enough for those enacting the policy and
that over time enforcement was not a priority for the adminis
tration (Michaels, 2008; Rossi, 2010). As Michael mentions, RPS
are politically easy to implement because: ‘‘It is easy to specify
legislatively and the cost of compliance might be more easily
concealed in utility bills than an outright tax on conventional
power or subsidy to renewables.’’ (Michaels, 2008, p. 86). But
‘‘having enacted seemingly stringent new standards, legislators
may have little to gain politically by vigorously enforcing them’’
(Michaels, 2008, p. 107).
In fact, RPS in most states allowed flexibility in the imple
mentation and did not have strong enforcement mechanisms.
Many RPS policies include flexibility provisions that exist to assist
suppliers in achieving RPS targets. A ‘‘true up period’’ is a three
month period in which suppliers are allowed to acquire the
necessary RECs, or make up any shortfall in renewables targets
(American Wind Energy Association, 1997). Credit banking also
exists, which allows generators and renewable energy suppliers
to ‘‘bank’’ credits indefinitely, allowing for an unspecified period
of time for them to make up any shortcomings in RPS goals.
Lastly, a force majeure provision allows for a further extension of
the ‘‘true up period’’ in cases of uncontrollable situations, such as
natural disasters, so that affected providers are not penalized
unnecessarily for compliance failures (American Wind Energy
Association, 1997). Force majeure provisions, also categorized as
escape clauses, vary depending upon the state. The majority of
states with RPS have an outlined escape clause, although some
states have no specified clause, such as New York and Massachu
setts.8 Although the policy specifies that utilities that do not
comply with RPS requirements may suffer penalties, there is no
evidence of strict enforcement of RPS programs, since there is no
record of penalties paid in the U.S. (Solsky and Bielenberg, 2004).
In conclusion, because RPS resembles command and control
regulation, it is likely to be ineffective at increasing investments
in renewable energy capacity when associated with lax enforce
ment mechanisms. We therefore hypothesize the following:
H1. RPS is ineffective at increasing investments in renewable
energy capacity.
MGPO requires utilities operating in the state to offer and
publicize green power options to consumers and provide a more
direct link than RPS to a potential demand effect. MGPO allows
customers to support the purchase of electricity from renewable
energy sources by their utilities. The principle of MGPO is that
8 Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008. Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard
Summary http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/massachusetts.
pdf and http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/new-york.pdf.consumers may increase demand for fuels perceived as envir
onmentally favorable and decrease demand for fuels perceived as
environmentally unfavorable. This mechanism requires several
preconditions. First, that consumers are willing to pay for renew
able energy and that there is choice among electricity products.
However, the mechanism does not require choice among elec
tricity providers.
An emerging literature suggests that consumer awareness
changes in response to environmental information (Desvousges
et al., 1992; Blamey et al., 2000; Loureiro, 2003; Loureiro and
Lotade, 2005; Leire and Thidell, 2005). Existing research reports
customers purchase of green power (Bird and Swezey, 2003) and
positive willingness to pay (WTP) for green energy electricity
premia (Byrnes et al., 1999; Ethier et al., 2000; Gossling et al.,
2005; Zarnikau, 2003; Bergmann et al., 2006). Borchers et al.
(2007) demonstrate a positive WTP for green energy electricity.
Further, the specific green energy source affects WTP. In fact,
individuals do exhibit preferences for solar versus a generic green
or wind source. Biomass and farm methane are found to be the
least preferred sources. Some studies have shown the extent of
customer participation in green pricing programs.
As of 2007, the total number of green customers was 835,651.9
Premium prices fluctuate depending on the customer’s monthly
electricity bill, but one tends to pay between 3 and 12 dollars per
month for a green electricity premium (Zarnikau, 2003). While
residential green customers may not make up a significant
demand for green electricity, some evidence suggests that non
residential users play an increasing role in the demand for green
electricity. The limited research conducted suggests that up to
60% of businesses indicates a willingness to pay a premium for
green power (Wiser et al., 2001). In addition, green power
programs that target non residential customers have seen over
20% of green power sales attributed to those customers (Wiser
et al., 2001). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency publishes
the National Top 50, a list of the organizations leading the way in
annual green power purchases. Corporations such as Intel, Pep
siCo, Whole Foods Market, and Kohl’s Department Stores are at
the top of the EPA’s list.10 PepsiCo and Whole Foods Market, for
example, can boast having 100% of their total electricity from
green power resources.11 As a part of their ‘‘Green Mission’’
section on their website, Whole Foods stated: ‘‘We were the first
major retailer to offset 100% of our energy use with wind energy
credits. And we are glad to see that some of the world’s largest
retailers are following the example we’ve set in green building,
the use of solar power, company wide recycling programs, inter
nal green mission programs and support for organics. When more
companies take green steps, we all win.’’12
We argue that such a potential increase in demand can trigger
electric utilities’ interest in power generation as they see a potential
for attracting green consumers to purchase green power at a
premium (Delmas et al., 2007). An increase in demand within the
state will have an effect on the production of renewable energy
within the state, a portion of which will be undertaken by electric
utilities that are also selling the electricity. Because MGPO is market
oriented, utilities incentives should be more aligned with the policy
than they are with RPS and facilitate its implementation of the
policy. We therefore hypothesize that MGPO will be effective at
increasing investments in renewable energy capacity.
9 http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/greenprice/green_pri
cing.html.
10 ‘‘National Top 50.’’ Green Power Partnership, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. http://www.epa.gov/grnpower/toplists/top50.htm.4
th
ex
si
ow
bo
si
th
in
Th
en
ut
ca
po
th
re
iti
as
H
re
4.
du
m
m
ar
im
fa
po
ca
re
be
pr
na
an
th
hi
Ly
en
po
po
M
en
el
pl
re
in
20
Ru
re
Le
en
M.A. Delmas, M.J. Montes-Sancho / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2273–2288 2277H2. MGPO is effective at increasing investments in renewable
energy capacity.
In conclusion, we expect differing effectivenesses between
RPSs and MGPO. While we expect an insignificant effect of RPS
on investments in renewable energy capacity, we expect a
positive effect of MGPO.
4.2. Electric utilities governance
Investor owned electric utilities are privately owned enter
prises (Electric Power Industry Overview, 2007).13 Investor
owned utilities provide electricity for approximately 100 million
individuals, about 71% of the country’s total consumer base
(Electric Power Industry Overview, 2007).14 In comparison, pub
licly owned electric utilities are local nonprofit organizations.
Public utilities represent roughly 61% of the total number of
electric utilities and supply approximately 9% of generating
capability, and account for about 15% of retail sales (Electric
Power Industry Overview, 2007).15 Publicly owned utilities
acquire their financing from the sale of general obligation bonds
and from revenue bonds secured by proceeds from the sale of
electricity (Electric Power Industry Overview, 2007).16
As private companies, investor owned utilities are motivated
primarily by turning a profit, and the constituencies with the
greatest influence on their financial wellbeing are their custo
mers. According to Stuart Hemphill, Southern California Edison’s
vice president of Alternative and Renewable Power, the point of
aggressively pursuing renewable energy contracts is that ‘‘every
contract we execute for renewable power is good for the industry,
our customers, and the environment.’’17 Scholars have shown that
under deregulation the freedoms conferred on utilities and the
competitive threats that they face elicited differentiation strate
gies based on green power products (Delmas et al., 2007). These
strategies can lead to green power products succeeding in the
marketplace because of the emergence of customer classes that
were suppressed under regulation by its historical accounting
practices and lack of incentives for innovation. Free to offer green
power options, utilities can use such initiatives to differentiate
themselves in ways that reflect their new realities under dereg
ulation. We should therefore expect electric utilities to be more
responsive to renewable policies that allow them to offer green
power products.
However, just as investor owned utilities want to prioritize
their customers’ demands, they are reliant upon their state’s PUC
in order to do so. Because PUCs determine the rate a utility is
allowed to earn, and therefore the rate that the utility will
eventually charge to its customers, PUCs have a great effect upon
investor owned utilities and their subsequent financial success
(Bonardi et al., 2006). Publicly owned utilities are governed by
their ‘‘consumer owners,’’ who may be locally elected or
appointed officials.18 Many utilities rely on the local governing
body, such as the city council, to regulate their actions.19 Within
13 They operate in all states except Nebraska, where electric utilities consist
primarily of municipal systems and public power districts.
14 They represent 6% of the total number of electric utilities and approxi-
mately 38% of utility installed capacity, 42% percent of generation, 66% percent ofab
Ly
po
en
sales, and 67% percent of revenue in the U.S.
15 As of 2007, there were 2009 publicly owned electric utilities in the U.S.
16 Electric Power Industry Overview (2007). Energy Information Administration.
17 ‘‘Southern California Edison Launches 2009 Solicitation for Renewable
Power.’’ Business Wire (2009).
18 American Public Power Association (APPA). http://www.appanet.org/uti
lity/index.cfm?ItemNumber=9857&navItemNumber=21031.
19 In 2005, the APPA reported that 60% of publicly owned utilities are
governed by a city council, while the remaining 40% are governed by an
independent utility board. http://www.appanet.org/utility/index.cfm?ItemNum
(fo
be
Ate Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LAWPD), for
ample, each member of the Board of Water and Power Commis
oners is appointed by the mayor for a five year term. So publicly
ned utilities might be more responsive to local governing
dies than investor owned utilities that might be more respon
ve to the policies issued by their PUCs at the state level.
Furthermore, investor owned utilities are more likely to have
e technical capabilities and financial resources to add on
crements of renewable power in comparison to public utilities.
is would include experience managing a diverse portfolio of
ergy types (Fremeth, 2009).
In conclusion, because investor owned and publicly owned
ilities respond to various stakeholders and have different
pabilities, we hypothesize a differing effect of renewable
licies on their investment in renewable capacity. We expect
at investor owned electric utilities will be more likely to
spond positively to renewable policies based on their capabil
es and the potential for environmental differentiation strategies
sociated with some of the policies.
ypothesis 3. Investor owned electric utilities will be more
sponsive to renewable policies than publicly owned utilities.
3. The context of renewable policies
While policies might have different potential for effectiveness
e to their design and according to the type of utility imple
enting them, we argue that we need to control for the environ
ent (natural, social, and political) in which renewable policies
e adopted, since this can have an impact on their successful
plementation.
First, the natural context should be examined as a potential
ctor in the implementation and effectiveness of renewable
licies. The renewable energy industry depends on natural
pital defined as ‘‘the stock that yields the flow of natural
sources’’ (Daly, 1996, p. 80) or indispensable resources and
nefits, essential for human survival and economic activity,
ovided by the ecosystem. As argued by Russo, renewable
tural capital such as wind or solar is difficult to move around
d geographic specific (Russo, 2003). While it has been shown
at it might be easier to implement policies in states with a
gher endowment in natural resources (Vachon and Menz, 2006;
on and Yin, 2010), it is unclear whether the natural resource
dowment alone can drive the effectiveness of renewable
licies. For example, Carley (2009) found that a state solar
tential was significant and positive at explaining the total
Wh of renewable energy electricity while the wind and biomass
dowment variables were negatively associated with renewable
ectricity.
Indeed, scholars have argued that natural capital must be com
emented by social and political capital to drive the adoption of
newable policies and the development of new technologies and
vestments in renewable resources (Lyon and Yin, 2010; Russo,
03; Sine and Lee, 2009; Vachon and Menz, 2006). For example
sso showed that industry associations and the number of existing
newable projects helped the development of new projects. Sine and
e (2009) found that environmental groups had a larger impact on
trepreneurial activity in the wind energy sector than the avail
ility of natural resources. Similarly, Vachon and Menz (2006) and
on and Yin (2010) found that political and social interests were
sitively and significantly related to the developments of renewable
ergy projects. Regarding the political factors, Carley (2009)
otnote continued)
r=9857&navItemNumber=21031.Managing Ethical Challenges by William
kinson.5
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Conservation environmental scores for the House) was positively
related to renewable generation, but that regulatory restructuring
was negatively related to renewable generation.
Because these natural, social, and political factors have been
shown to facilitate the development of renewable policies and
also of energy investments, it is important to take them into
account in order to isolate the effect of a renewable policy. It is
indeed possible that there are a number of differences between
states that have adopted policies and states that have not in terms
of natural, social, and political factors, and that these factors,
rather than the policy implemented, might have explained differ
ences in investments in renewable energy. In conclusion, in line
with previous studies, we expect that natural, social, and political
capital will facilitate the adoption of renewable policies and
investments in renewable energy. Thus in order to isolate the
effect of policies and control for self selection bias, we need to use
econometrics methodologies that simultaneously predict the
adoption of renewable policy and the determinants of a firm
decision to invest in renewable capacity.5. MethodologyTo test the effectiveness of RPS and MGPO policies, we used a
two stage modeling technique that controls for self selection
(Heckman, 1978). This two stage estimation determines simulta
neously the adoption of RPS at the state level and the determi
nants of a firm’s decision to invest in renewable capacity.
In the first stage regression, we present a binomial logit to
predict the adoption of the renewable energy policy at the state
level. This model provides an estimation of the likelihood that a
given state will adopt a renewable energy policy.
The adoption model in the binary logit model is specified as
follows (first stage):
ProbðRenewable policyi,t ¼ 1Þ ¼ FðZ0i,t1bÞ ðModel1aÞ
where Renewable policy is the binary dependent variable of this
first stage. This variable represents the decision of the state to
adopt a renewable policy. It takes a value equal to 1 the year of
enrollment and the following years and 0 otherwise. Zi,t1 is the
set of exogenous independent variables that explain the decision
of the state to adopt a renewable policy, and F is the cumulative
logistic distribution (FðxÞ ¼ ex=ð1þexÞ ¼ 1=ð1þexÞ). The indepen
dent variables are used with 1 lagged year to avoid reverse
causality.
In the second stage regression, we use the predicted values of
renewable policies to test whether these explained renewable
capacity at the firm level. Because the distribution of the capacity
variable is skewed and the data are censored at zero, conventional
regression methods cannot be used. Instead, we use a Tobit
model, which assumes that the distribution of the error term is
normal and the estimation explicitly takes limit and non limit
observations into account (Greene, 2008).20 We include fixed
effect factors for years.21
20 We tested whether the residuals of our regressions are normally distrib-
uted. We performed the Skewness and Kurtosis, the Shapiro–Wilk, and the
Shapiro–Francia tests for normality, which do not reject the hypothesis of normal
distribution. Hence it is appropriate to use the Tobit model for our data. TheShapiro–Wilk test is based on Shapiro and Wilk (1965) and the Shapiro–Francia
test is based on Shapiro and Francia (1972). The Skewness and Kurtosis tests for
normality are based on a combined measure of skewness and kurtosis of the data
(D’Agostino et al., 1990; Royston, 1991).
21 Unconditional fixed-effects Tobit models may be estimated but the esti-
mates are biased (STATA 7, 2001, p. 474). We also ran a random effects model.
Unfortunately, the quadrature approximation underlying the estimation of theThe second stage regression is presented below:
Renewable capacityi,t d Renewable policyi,t 1þX0i,t 1gþe ðModel1bÞ
where the variable Renewable capacity is the dependent variable
that we use to measure the effectiveness of renewable policies.
Renewable policyi,t 1 is the predicted probability of adopting a
renewable policy obtained in the first stage using binary logit, and
Xi,t1 is a set of control variables that could also explain invest
ments in renewable capacity. Renewable policy and the set of
control variables are one year lagged.
In order to test the effect of renewable policies on investments
in renewable capacity, we collected data from a number of
sources to assess investment in renewable capacity, renewable
policies, state characteristics, and electric utility characteristics.
The variables are described below and in Table A2 in the
Appendix. The variables included in the first stage regression
are consistent with previous studies (Carley, 2009). In the second
stage, we added a variable related to the type of electric utility,
namely investor owned and publicly owned. The sample consists
of 650 electric utilities in 48 states for the period 1998 2007,
with 1/3 of investor owned utilities and 2/3 of publicly owned
utilities. The firms in our sample represent 72% of the electricity
produced by utilities in the U.S. from 1997 to 2007. The states of
Alaska and Hawaii are not included in the analysis due to lack of
available data on natural resources.
The main dependent variable is renewable capacity. The vari
able is defined as the sum of the maximum rated output of all
units owned per utility (thousand of MW). Information was
obtained from the Energy Information Administration Form 860.
5.1. Renewable policies
We collected data from the Database of State Incentives for
Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE) to gather information on RPS,
disclosure policies, tax incentives, and the MGPO.
5.1.1. Renewable Portfolio Standard
This variable captures the effect of operating in a state with an
established RPS (Delmas et al., 2007). We first create a variable
that takes the value 1 if the state had an RPS in place and 0 if
otherwise. For multi state utilities, this variable is weighted based
on the percentage of electricity produced within each state by the
utility.
5.1.2. Mandatory Green Power Option
The MGPO is a policy adopted by certain states that requires
the state’s electric utilities to offer ‘‘green power’’ to its custo
mers, either through their own generation or through the pur
chase of renewable energy credits (RECs). The variable takes the
value of 1 if a state has implemented MGPO, and 0 if otherwise.
5.1.3. Disclosure policies
Some states require electric utilities to provide their customers
with specific information about the electricity that the utility
supplies. This information, which must be shared with customers
periodically, usually includes the utility’s fuel mix percentages
and emissions statistics. We create a variable on disclosure based
on the enacted year, where the value of the variable is 1 for the
(footnote continued)
random-effects model is problematic in our data set and the parameter estimates
of the random-effects model are not stable. Two aspects of random-effects models
have the potential to make the quadrature approximation inaccurate: large groupsizes and large correlations within groups (STATA 7, 2001, p. 476). These factors
can also work in tandem, decreasing or increasing the reliability of the quadrature.
Therefore, we do not report them in this paper.
6
year the policy was enacted and for all years thereafter, and 0 if
otherwise. For multi state utilities, this variable is weighted based
on the percentage of production within each state by the utility.
5.
U
po
cl
la
la
ec
m
lim
ca
no
5.
th
fr
op
pr
in
N
5.
ab
th
5.
go
Vo
st
w
5.
ca
w
gi
(2
of
or
su
de
va
0
Table 1
Logit Model of the adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards and MGPO.
RPS MGPO
1997–2006 2001–2006
RPS 5.88**
(2.31)
Disclosure 0.83
(0.59)
0.42
(0.99)
Wind resources 1.14***
(0.22)
1.57*
(0.83)
Solar resources 0.52***
(0.12)
1.10**
(0.45)
Biomass resources 0.59***
(0.19)
1.18*
(0.64)
Deregulation 0.62
(0.69)
0.16
(1.82)
Democratic governor 0.24
(0.47)
2.41**
(1.03)
Democratic representative 0.04**
(0.02)
0.17***
(0.05)
League of Conservation Voters 0.07***
(0.01)
0.02
(0.04)
Sierra membership 0.25
(0.25)
1.53*
(0.87)
Renewable associations 5.92***
(1.45)
5.85*
(3.16)
Percent of electricity generated from
renewables
0.16***
(0.04)
1.99***
(0.42)
Emissions 0.53***
(0.18)
6.10***
(1.66)
Income per capita 0.18***
(0.07)
0.50**
(0.20)
Unemployment 1.54***
(0.27)
1.16
(0.98)
Electricity retail price 0.04
(0.13)
3.45***
(1.04)
Constant 25.42***
(4.66)
28.95**
(13.61)
Observations 480 288
Pseudo R2 0.634 0.715
Percent of correctly classified 91.46 97.22
Year dummies are included, but they are not reported.
* po0.10.
** po 0.05.
*** po0.01.
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This variable encompasses the index of corporate, sales, and
property tax implemented in each state, dating back to 1975
(sales and property tax incentives) and 1976 for corporate tax
va
by
En
5.
no
ot
N
5.
pr
po
Hincentives. The variable is calculated as the number of tax
incentives implemented in each state until that year, ranging
from 0 to 3. For example, if a state has two tax incentives in place,
one in 1997 and another in 2005, the variable takes a value of
1 for the period 1997 2004 and the value of 2 for the period
2005 2007. As can be seen in Table 1, all states but two that have
RPS or MGPO also have tax incentives or have none of these.
Because of this co linearity issue it was not possible to include
that variable in the first stage regression.
5.2. States’ natural resources
We incorporate variables regarding the availability of wind,
solar, and biomass in the state where the utility operates. pr2.1. Wind potential
Wind energy potential has been systematically studied in the
.S. (Elliott and Schwartz, 1993; Elliot et al., 1987). Here, wind
tential is measured by the sum of land (in km2) subject to all
asses of wind, with environmental exclusions and moderate
nd use exclusions. Environmental exclusions are defined as
rge natural areas including parks, monuments, wilderness areas,
ological preserves, and wildlife refuges where industrial, com
ercial, and residential developments are restricted or very
ited. Land use exclusions consider the 11 different land use
tegorizations (see Table 2). The states of Alaska and Hawaii are
t included in the analysis due to lack of data.
2.2. Solar potential
Solar potential is defined by the ratio of insolation, which is
e monthly average daily total radiation using input derived
om satellite and/or surface observations of cloud cover, aerosol
tical depth, precipitable water vapor, albedo, atmospheric
essure, and ozone resampled to a 40 km resolution. This
formation was obtained from the Solar Atlas provided by the
ational Renewable Energy Laboratory.
2.3. Biomass potential
As provided by Milbrandt (2005), the biomass potential vari
le is defined as the total biomass resources available (per
ousand tons) in each state.
3. State characteristics
We also include variables such as deregulation, Democratic
vernor, Democratic representative, League of Conservation
ters, Sierra Club, renewable association, income per capita,
ate emissions, unemployment, and electricity retail price all of
hich we categorize as state characteristics.
3.1. Deregulation
To pick up the effect of deregulation in the installed renewable
pacity, we created a time changing variable that represents
hether or not a retail deregulation policy had been enacted in a
ven state. Following Delmas and Tokat (2005) and Delmas et al.
007), we created a time changing variable that takes the value
1 starting in the year in which retail deregulation was enacted
a regulatory order was issued, and 0 otherwise. Some states,
ch as California, have suspended retail choice after years of
regulation. In these cases, the variable deregulation takes the
lue of 1 during the period where deregulation was active and
the suspended year and the following years. At utility level, this
riable was weighted based on the percentage of electricity sold
the utility in each state. The information comes from the
ergy Information Administration.
3.2. Democratic governor
We utilize a dummy variable indicating a Democratic gover
rship, with 1 indicating the governor is a Democrat and 0 if
herwise. Information for the variable was obtained from the
ational Conference of the State Legislature.
3.3. Democratic representative
We incorporate this variable to test for the effect of ideological
eference on the willingness to adopt state renewable energy
licies. This variable is defined as the weighted percentage of
ouse and Senate seats occupied by Democrats. Information is
ovided by National Conference of State Legislatures.
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5.3.4. League of Conservation Voters
Several researchers have used the scores of the League of
Conservation Voters as a measure of the preferences of the
elected representatives of a state (Delmas et al., 2007;
5.3.5. Sierra Club
To determine the presence of renewable associations in each
state level. Information was found from the Environmental
Analysis, we measure the median income per capita in each state.
unemployment rates provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
information obtained from the Energy Information Administra
Table 2
Tobit Model of Renewable Capacity (1998–2007) using enacted RPS year.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
RPS 0.05
(0.06)
0.10
(0.07)
RPS Investor 0.39**
(0.16)
MGPO 0.18**
(0.07)
0.21**
(0.08)
Predicted RPS 0.15**
(0.07)
0.37***
(0.13)
Predicted RPS Investor 0.62**
(0.2)
Predicted MGPO 0.22**
(0.09)
0.21**
(0.09)
Disclosure 0.08
(0.06)
0.07
(0.06)
0.04
(0.05)
0.03
(0.05)
Financial incentives 0.04
(0.04)
0.03
(0.03)
0.03
(0.04)
0.02
(0.03)
Wind resources 0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Solar resources 0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
Biomass resources 0.02
(0.03)
0.03
(0.03)
0.01
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
Deregulation 0.11
(0.08)
0.12
(0.08)
0.17*
(0.09)
0.17**
(0.08)
Democratic governor 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Democratic representative 0.01**
(0.00)
0.01**
(0.00)
0.01**
(0.00)
0.01**
(0.00)
League Conservation Voters 0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Sierra membership 0.09**
(0.04)
0.10***
(0.04)
0.07**
(0.03)
0.08**
(0.03)
Renewable associations 0.08
(0.07)
0.03
(0.05)
0.04
(0.06)
0.03
(0.05)
Percent of electricity
generated from
renewables
0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
Emissions 0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
0.00
(0.03)
0.00
(0.02)
Income per capita 0.00
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
0.00
(0.01)
Unemployment 0.02
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
Electric retail price 0.02
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
0.02
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
Investor owned utilities 0.12
(0.05)
0.05
(0.10)
0.12
(0.08)
0.10
(0.11)
Green residential customers 0.03**
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.01)
Percent of generation from
fossil fuels
0.13*
(0.08)
0.12*
(0.06)
0.14*
(0.08)
0.11*
(0.05)
Total customers 0.23*
(0.12)
0.24**
(0.12)
0.22*
(0.12)
0.23*
(0.12)
Constant 0.39
(0.49)
0.19
(0.45)
0.64
(0.53)
0.36
(0.47)
Observations 5807 5807 5807 5807
Pseudo R2 0.353 0.384 0.354 0.398
Year dummies are included in all models, but are not reported.
* po0.1.
** po0.05.
*** po0.01.
M.A. Delmas, M.J. Montes-Sancho / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2273–22882280Hamilton, 1997; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002, 2006; Lubell et al.,
2002; Viscusi and Hamilton, 1999). Each year, the League of
Conservation Voters selects environmental issues to constitute an‘‘environmental agenda,’’ with a panel comprising the main U.S.
environmental groups. The organization then creates an index by
counting the number of times each representative or senator in
Congress votes favorably on the environmental agenda (e.g., on
the global warning gag rule, tropical forest conservation, or global
climate change). The index ranges from 0 to 100, with 100
representing a record of voting for the environmental agenda in
all cases. The variable is the average of the environmental scores
of the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. senators of the states
where each utility is operated (Kahn, 2002) weighted by the
percentage of generation of each firm in each state for multi state
utilities.In line with previous studies (e.g., Delmas and Montes, 2010;
Helland, 1998; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Maxwell et al., 2000;
Riddel, 2003), we measure the environmental preferences of the
population of the state in which a firm operates based on
membership figures for one of the major environmental non
governmental organizations, the Sierra Club. The measure itself is
the number of dues paying Sierra Club members per 1000 state
residents in each year.
5.3.6. Renewable associationsstate, we utilized information provided by the American Solar
Energy Society (ASES). Member chapters of the ASES include both
solar and general renewables chapters.
Percentage of renewable generation. This variable is the percen
tage of renewable generation, excluding hydro generation, over
the total net generation of total electric industry at state level.
5.3.7. Emissions
This variable is a factor of CO2, SO2, and NOx emissions at theProtection Agency, Clean Air Market.
5.3.8. Income per capita
Using information obtained from the Bureau of EconomicThis measure of income is calculated as the income of the
residents in a given area divided by the resident population of
the area. The information comes from the Energy Information
Administration, State Electric Profiles.
5.3.9. Unemployment
To further examine the economic situation on a state by state
basis, we incorporated a variable on unemployment, utilizing5.3.10. Electricity retail price
This variable is defined by the average price for the total
electricity industry (cents per KWh) in each state. We usedtion, State Electric Profiles.
5.4. Electric utility characteristics
We examine several variables to assess utility characteristics.
This includes percentage of green residential customers, fuel mix
of generated electricity, and total customers served by the utility
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M.A. Delmas, M.J. Montes-Sancho / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2273–2288 2281and differentiated variables for publicly versus privately owned
utilities.
5.4.1. Investor owned
To differentiate between investor owned and publicly owned
electric utilities, we employ a dummy variable. Information describ
ing the difference between investor owned and publicly owned
utilities was found from the Energy Information Administration.
5.4.2. Green residential customers
This variable is the percentage of the number of residential
customers who purchase electricity generated from renewable
resources or pay for renewable energy development over the total
number of residential customers served by the utility. The
information comes from EIA, form 861.
5.4.3. Percentage of generation from fossil fuel
The type of technology a firm uses for generating electricity
might explain its environmental strategies (Delmas et al., 2007).
To account for these differences, we utilize the percentage of
generation from fossil fuel using data from EIA, form 906.
5.4.4. Total customers
Using information from Energy Information Administration,
this variable reports the total number of customers (in millions)
served by the utility.
6. Results
re
di
im
th
4
th
M
Th
w
de
si
pr
of
St
no
Th
in
th
pr
ca
re
m
to
fu
m
al
th
yeThe first set of models is the logit models of the adoption of
RPS and MGPO at the state level. The analysis is conducted for the
years 1997 2006 for RPS and only from 2001 to 2006 for
MGPO since there was no MGPO policy available before 2000.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix
and the logit models are presented in Table 1. The second set of
models is the Tobit model of investments in renewables for the
period 1998 2007. Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables
A4a and 4b in the Appendix and the Tobit models are presented
in Table 2.
The results from the logit models representing the adoption of
RPS and MGPO show that these two policies were adopted in very
different institutional contexts and in states with different natural
resource endowments.
The variable representing wind resources is positive and
significant to predict RPS and MGPO at the 1% and 10% levels,
respectively. However, the variable representing solar resources
is related positively and significantly to RPS but negatively
to MGPO. Biomass resources are negatively related to both
policies.
Regarding the political and social contexts, we find that the
percentage of seats occupied by Democrats is positively and signifi
cantly related to both policies. The presence of a Democratic governor
is only significantly related to MGPO, while the League Conservation
Voters are only significantly related to RPS. Sierra membership is
negatively related to both policies but not significant (or only at the
10% level for MGPO). Renewable associations tend to play a sig
nificant role in the adoption of RPS and MGPO policies, at the 1% and
10% levels, respectively. Deregulation and disclosure programs are not
significant at predicting the adoption of the policies.
RPS is more likely to be implemented in states with a higher
percentage of electricity generated from renewables and more
emissions, higher income per capita, and lower rate of unemploy
ment, while the opposite is true for MGPO. Retail price isgatively and significantly related to MGPO but insignificantly
lated to RPS.
In conclusion, while both policies were adopted in relatively
milar political and social contexts, we find that they were
opted in very different economic contexts. The natural endow
ent of these states also differs, with a higher endowment in
lar energy for states that adopted RPS.
The models predicting renewable capacity are presented
Table 2. In these models we use enacted policy as the
dependent variable. In Models 1 and 2 we use the RPS
riable (independently from the first stage regression) and in
odels 3 and 4 we use the predicted RPS and predicted MGPO
riables from the first stage regression. We find that the effect
the RPS variable on installed renewable capacity is insignif
ant in Models 1 and 2. The effect of the predicted RPS is
gative and significant in Models 3 and 4 when we present the
sults of the two stage model. Overall, we do not find that RPS
effective at explaining investments in renewable capacity.
is confirms Hypothesis 1. We even find a negative and
gnificant effect for RPS when we control for the context of
e adoption of RPS. This indicates a self selection bias that we
rrected. The variable representing MGPO policies is signifi
nt and positive in all models (po0.05), indicating a signifi
nt effect of this policy on renewable capacity. This confirms
ypothesis 2.
In Models 2 and 4, we include an interaction term between
S and investor owned utilities. This term shows to be signifi
nt and positive (po0.05). This indicates that RPS is more
fective at driving investor owned utilities to invest in renew
le capacity in comparison to publicly owned utilities. This
nfirms Hypothesis 3. Regarding the effectiveness of other
newable policies, we do not see a significant effect for the
sclosure and financial incentives variables.
We argued for modeling the context in which policies are
plemented to measure their true effectiveness and found
at the results for RPS differ when we do so. Models 3 and
show a negative and significant coefficient for RPS when
e sign was insignificant in models 1 and 2. The coefficient for
GPO does not change according to the different specifications.
is might indicate that there is no sample bias associated
ith MGPO.
Turning to the state characteristics, the variables representing
mocratic representative and Sierra membership show to be
gnificant and positive in all models and seem to be a better
edictor of investments in renewable capacity than the presence
renewable associations or of high League Conservation Voters.
ate renewable potential (wind, solar, and biomass resources) is
t significant at predicting investments in renewable capacity.
e variable deregulation is negative in all models and significant
models 3 (po0.10) and 4 (po0.05). This is consistent with
e findings of Kim (2009), who found that deregulation did not
ove to be an effective mechanism for increase in renewable
pacity.
As for specific utility characteristics, the percentage of green
sidential customers shows to be significant at predicting invest
ents in renewables, as does electric utility size measured as the
tal number of customers. Firms with higher percentage of fossil
els are also less likely to invest in renewable capacity.
We conducted several robustness tests. First, because we
ight expect that it takes time for the policies to be effective, we
so conducted additional models using different time lags for
e renewable policies as a robustness test (from two to five
ar lags).22 Overall these models present similar results.
22 Results available upon request from the authors.
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M.A. Delmas, M.J. Montes-Sancho / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2273–22882282Second, because RPSs might have different levels of stringency
we wanted to test whether our results were robust for these
different types of RPSs. We therefore categorized RPSs into two
categories. The first one represents RPSs with the requirement to
build new capacity in state. The second category represents RPSs
without such requirements. Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix
provide the results of the two stage regressions. Overall, the
results show that both types of RPS policies have a negative and
insignificant effect on renewable capacity. However, the effect is
significant and positive for the interaction term between RPS
with requirements and investor owned utilities. Third, we
wanted to test whether there would be an additive effect of
renewable policies. We conducted an additional analysis with a
variable that represents the number of different renewable
policies implemented by a state. This variable is insignificant
in all models, indicating that there is no additive value to the
policies and the possibility that policies might cancel each
other.237. Discussion and conclusion
10The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of two
different state renewable energy policies Renewable Portfolio
Standards and Mandatory Green Power Options on installed
renewable energy capacity. Our results show varied effects of
the policies. RPS has proven to have a negative effect on invest
ments in renewable capacity. Our results differ therefore from
previous studies that found RPS to be effective at increasing
installed wind capacity (Bird et al., 2005; Menz and Vachon, 2006;
Yin and Powers, 2010) and show the importance of modeling the
context of policy adoption to avoid sample selection bias.
Furthermore, the effect of RPS on investments in renewables
changes in our model when we include an interaction term
between RPS and investor owned utilities. The result is a positive
and significant effect, demonstrating that investor owned utilities
respond more to the implementation of RPS than do publicly
owned utilities.
As expected, the effect of the more market oriented policy
Mandatory Green Power Option proved to be positive and
significant. Specifically, our results show that MGPO, which
requires utilities to provide green electricity to their customers,
has proven effective in increasing installed renewable capacity.
We also found that the variable for green residential customers
provided positive and significant results. Essentially, the more the
customers willing to pay a premium for green electricity, the
greater the installed renewable capacity.
Our analysis differs from previous studies because this is the
first paper to distinguish between utility ownership types, and
thus provides further insight into the differentiated effect of the
implementation of RPS on investor owned versus publicly owned
electric utilities. Additionally, our green residential customers
variable depicts the influential effect consumers can have upon
installed capacity.
When analyzing the effect of resource potential, we found that
solar and wind potential have a positive and significant impact on
the adoption of renewable policies (at least RPS). However,
resource potential was not significant in explaining installments
of renewable capacity. Our results indicate that the relationship
between natural resources, policies, and installed capacity can be
complex. While higher natural resources endowment can facil
itate the adoption of policies that are not effective, some effective
policies might be adopted in states with low resource potential.
23 Results available upon request from the authors.Our results conclude therefore that factors other than natural
resources can predict successful renewable policies. These factors
include the social and political context in which the policy is
implemented, the type of renewable policy, and the type of
electric utility implementing it. Our findings indicate that a high
presence of Sierra Club membership, green residential customers,
and democratic representatives facilitate effective policies. These
represent various communities that constitute an environment
conducive to environmental conservation behavior highlighted in
the literature (Kahn, 2007).
In determining the efficacy of these state renewable energy
policies on installed capacity, it is critical to account for the lag
time between the implementation of these policies and the
installment of renewable capacity. The difficult question is: how
much time must actually be accounted for in order to see a policy
truly take effect? While we do observe a general trend of
increased installments in renewable capacity over a ten year
period (1997 2007), RPS remains a non significant variable
despite using models with up to five year time lags between its
implementation and installed capacity. It certainly is possible that
a decade is not a sufficient period of time to see RPS take effect,
because to this point it has not proved to be an influential factor
on installed capacity.
It is also important to take into account our market findings,
and the role of the market in affecting installed capacity. We find
the variables for MGPO and green residential customers to be
positive and significant, providing evidence that market mechan
isms have the most substantial effect upon installed capacity.
Thus, policies that influence the customer’s ability to purchase
green power, and the subsequent number of customers choosing
to do so, have been a significant contributor to the rise in installed
capacity over the last decade.
There are some recommendations that can be made regarding
renewable policies based on our results. While we see that market
mechanisms have a significant effect upon installed capacity,
policies such as RPS, disclosure, and tax incentives have proven
to be insignificant, which is problematic. Over the past decade,
states have attempted to assume the responsibility that the
federal government failed to take regarding national environ
mental policies (Keeler, 2007). However, inherent aspects of these
state policies such as flexibility clauses and the ability of
utilities to employ out of state resources to meet renewable
requirements for RPS make it difficult for these policies to truly
make a difference (Keeler, 2007).
A potential solution to the problem could be incorporating the
federal government in the renewable policy enactment and
implementation process. The Clean Energy Group submitted a
series of suggestions to the House of Representatives in 2007
regarding the interaction between state renewable policies and a
federal RPS program. They recommend a federal RPS that assists
states in reaching their RPS objectives, that sets a floor (but no
ceiling) on renewable capacity across all states, and that builds off
existing state and regional certificate tracking systems to allow
for a synchronized use of RECs.24 While these suggestions seem
credible, the Clean Energy Group’s belief that ‘‘a well designed
RPS would ideally apply equally to all load serving utilities’’ does
not align with our findings.25 One difficulty with currently
implemented RPS programs seems to be the differentiated
response from investor owned and publicly owned utilities, and
thus there should be differing requirements depending on the
utility type. Indeed, moving from the state to the federal level
24 Sinclair, Mark. Letter to Congressmen John D. Dingell and Rick Boucher.
14 June 2007. MS. Clean Energy Group, Montpelier, Vermont.
25 Sinclair, Mark. Letter to Congressmen John D. Dingell and Rick Boucher.
14 June 2007. MS. Clean Energy Group, Montpelier, Vermont.
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mandatory state policies into a coherent federal program (Keeler,
2007).
There is still further research to be done on the efficacy of state
renewable policies on installed capacity. In order to determine the
reasoning behind publicly and investor owned utilities’ varied
responses to renewable policies, further research should be
conducted on specific firm level factors. A firm’s management
style and its business strategy should be analyzed, for these
factors may influence a utility’s decision to install renewable
capacity or not. This information may in fact be critical in devisingTable A1
Renewable policies and total electric capacity by state in 2007.
State RPS MGPO Disclosure
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona X
Arkansas
California X X
Colorado X X X
Connecticut X X
Delaware X X X
Florida X
Georgia
Hawaii X
Idaho
Illinois X X
Indiana
Iowa X X X
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine X X
Maryland X X
Massachusetts X X
Michigan X
Minnesota X X
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana X X
Nebraska
Nevada X X
New Hampshire X
New Jersey X X
New Mexico X X
New York X X
North Carolina X
North Dakota X
Ohio X
Oklahoma
Oregon X X X
Pennsylvania X X
Rhode Island X X
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas X X
Utah
Vermont X
Virginia X
Washington X X X
West Virginia
Wisconsin X
Wyoming
a Tax column includes corporate, sales, and property taxes. An ‘‘X’’ demonstrates thatture state, and even federal policies so that they will have the
eatest effect upon electric utilities. Further research could also
entify whether specific policies are more effective at driving an
crease in capacity for specific renewable energies (wind, solar,
biomass).See Tables A1 A6.Taxa Capacity (MW) Percentage of renewable
capacity (%)
30,614 1.87
1961 o1
X 25,579 2.28
15,296 o1
63,813 5.75
X 12,288 7.92
X 7725 2.56
3357 o1
X 55,451 1.83
X 36,472 1.79
X 2436 7.97
X 3196 5.71
X 42,731 1.85
X 27,021 o1
X 12,287 8.85
X 11,241 2.98
X 19,968 o1
X 26,323 1.41
X 4213 17.91
X 12,486 1.14
X 13,557 2.46
X 30,305 1.27
X 12,890 11.33
16,204 1.23
X 20,558 o1
X 5479 3.75
X 6971 1.09
X 9954 3.37
X 4280 4.23
X 18,352 1.23
X 7202 6.31
X 39,121 2.01
X 27,644 1.24
X 5091 7.35
X 33,755 o1
X 19,962 3.56
X 13,209 9.00
X 45,106 1.70
X 1782 1.29
X 23,566 10.06
X 2870 1.38
X 20,861 o1
X 101,938 4.28
X 7122 o1
X 1111 8.35
X 22,992 2.94
X 28,615 5.27
X 16,099 o1
X 16,365 2.19
X 6667 4.08
a state has implemented at least one of these taxes.
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Table A2
Description of the variables.
Name Description Source
Renewable Capacity Nameplate capacity: sum of the maximum rated output of
all renewable units, excluding hydro, owned by the utility
(MW)
Energy lnformation Administration (EIA), Form 860
RPS RPS program based on the enacted year Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy (DSIRE)
Mandatory Green Power
Option (MGPO)
Mandatory Utility Green Power Option for Renewable
Energy using enacted year
Database of States Incentives for Renewable Energy
(DSIRE)
Several states require certain electric utilities to offer
customers the option of buying electricity generated from
renewable resources, commonly known as ‘‘green power.’’
Typically, utilities offer green power generated using
renewable resources that the utilities own (or for which they
contract), or they buy renewable energy credits (RECs) from a
renewable energy provider certified by a state public utilities
commission
http://www.dsireusa.org
Disclosure Disclosure program based on enacted year Database of States Incentives for Renewable Energy
(DSIRE)
1 the enacted year and after, 0 otherwise http://www.dsireusa.org
Financial incentives Index of corporate, sales and property tax Database of States Incentives for Renewable Energy
(DSIRE)
http://www.dsireusa.org
Wind potential Sum of km2 of land subject to all class of wind with
environmental exclusiona and moderate land-useb
exclusions
Elliot et al. (1987).
Solar potential Ratio of insolation National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
http://www.nrel.gov
Biomass potential Biomass tons Milbrandt (2005)
Deregulation Deregulation based on enacted year. Energy lnformation Administration (EIA)
It takes 1 the enacted year and after, 0 Otherwise http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/
restructuring/restructure_elect.html
Dem. Governor Democrat governorship National Conference of the State Legislature
http://www.ncsl.org
Dem. Representative Weighted percentage of house and senates seats occupied by
democrats
National Conference of the State Legislature
http://www.ncsl.org
League Conservation Voters Score for LCV League Conservation Voters
http://lcv.org
Sierra Club membership Sierra membership over total population per state Sierra Club chapters
Renewable associations Presence of American Solar Energy Society ASES Chapter in
each state.
ASES Member listing
http://www.ases.org
Includes both solar and renewable chapters.
Percentage of renewable
generation
Percentage of renewable generation excluding hydro over
the total net generation of total electric industry at state
level
Energy lnformation Administration, State Electric Profiles
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/state
Emissions Factor of CO2, SO2, and NOx emissions
Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air market.
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/
Income per capita Per capita income per thousand dollars
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
http://www.bea.gov
This measure of income is calculated as the income of the
residents of a given area divided by the resident population
of the area
Unemployment Unemployment rate Bureau of Labor Statistics
http://www.bls.gov
Electricity Retail Price Average price for total electric industry (Cents per KWh) Energy lnformation Administration, State Electric Profiles
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/state
Investor owned Dummy for investor owned utilities Investor-owned electric utilities are privately-owned
entitiesc
Green residential customers Percentage of residential customers that purchase green
power over total number of residential customers served by
the utility
Energy lnformation Administration (EIA), Form 861
Percentage of generation
from fossil fuels
Percentage of generation from fossil fuels Energy lnformation Administration (EIA), Form 906
Total customers Total number of customers served per utility Energy lnformation Administration (EIA), Form 861
Publicly Owned Dummy for publicly owned utilities Publicly owned electric utilities are nonprofit government
entities that are organized at either the local or State leveld
a Environmental exclusion areas are defined to largely represent natural areas including parks, monuments, wilderness areas, ecological preserves, and wildlife refuges
where industrial, commercial, and residential developments are restricted or very 1imited.
b Land-use exclusion considers the 11 land-use types: (1) agricultural land; (2) range land; (3) mixed agricultural and range land; (4) deciduous forest ; (5) coniferous
forest; (6) mixed forest; (7) urban land; (8) barren land; (9) nonforested wetland, (10) water; and (11) open, low scrub land.
c EIA website: investor owned utilities represent 6% of the total number of electric utilities and approximately 38% of utility installed capacity, 42% of generation, 66%
of sales, and 67% of revenue in the U.S.
d EIA website: publicly owned utilities are 2009 publicly owned electric utilities in the U.S. They represent about 61% of the number of electric utilities, supply
approximately 9% of generating capability, 8% of generation, and account for about 15% of retail sales and 13% of revenue.
M.A. Delmas, M.J. Montes-Sancho / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 2273–22882284
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Table A3
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables used in the Renewable Portfolio Standard analysis.
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 RPS 0.25 0.43
2 MGPO 0.05 0.22 0.21
3 Disclosure 0.30 0.46 0.39 0.07
4 Wind resources 7.39 3.23 0.23 0.18 0.07
5 Solar resources 19.15 2.74 0.01 0.02 0.23 0.09
6 Biomass resources 8.50 1.31 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.09
7 Deregulation 0.34 0.47 0.24 0.03 0.52 0.11 0.24 0.28
8 Democratic governor 0.44 0.54 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.09
9 Democratic
representative
50.74 14.75 0.16 0.03 0.08 0.34 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.05
10 League of
Conservation Voters
43.81 27.53 0.37 0.01 0.41 0.01 0.50 0.27 0.29 0.09 0.37
11 Sierra membership 1.94 1.18 0.32 0.17 0.40 0.08 0.14 0.28 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.45
12 Renewable
associations
0.68 0.47 0.36 0.02 0.43 0.20 0.09 0.09 0.31 0.15 0.23 0.37 0.44
13 Percent of electricity
generated from
renewables
2.49 4.04 0.25 0.07 0.22 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.17 0.34 0.13 0.30 0.34 0.24
14 Emissions 0.08 1.67 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.21 0.04 0.40 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.24 0.41 0.04 0.25
15 Income per capita 28.22 5.23 0.47 0.04 0.65 0.11 0.27 0.21 0.40 0.02 0.04 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.06 0.14
16 Unemployment 4.97 1.33 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.23
17 Electricity retail price 6.95 1.97 0.39 0.08 0.40 0.07 0.28 0.35 0.48 0.01 0.27 0.58 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.20 0.54 0.06
N 480. The states of Alaska and Hawaii are not included in the analysis due to lack of data on natural resources. Correlations with values equal or greater than 0.09 are
significant at 5% (in bold).
Table A4a
Descriptive statistics of the variable used in the renewable capacity model analysis.
Mean SD
Renewable capacity 0.01 0.10
RPS 0.32 0.46
MPGO 0.09 0.28
Disclosure 0.40 0.49
Financial incentives 0.91 0.86
Wind resources 8.75 2.93
Solar resources 19.52 2.68
Biomass resources 9.23 1.07
Deregulation 0.27 0.44
Democratic governor 45.85 52.92
Democratic representative 48.12 11.43
League of Conservation Voters 41.25 24.48
Sierra membership 1.90 1.17
Renewable associations 0.78 0.41
Percent of electricity generated from renewables 2.07 2.75
Emissions 0.08 1.58
Income per capita 29.69 4.63
Unemployment 4.67 1.20
Electricity retail price 6.87 1.75
Investor owned 0.20 0.40
Green residential customers 0.12 0.72
Percent of generation from fossil fuel 0.82 0.35
Total customers 0.16 0.49
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Table A4b
Correlation matrix of the variable used in the renewable capacity model analysis.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Renewable capacity
2 RPS 0.04
3 MPGO 0.00 0.37
4 Disclosure 0.06 0.27 0.21
5 Financial incentives 0.03 0.44 0.14 0.24
6 Wind resources 0.00 0.31 0.18 0.06 0.16
7 Solar resources 0.02 0.26 0.07 0.38 0.31 0.24
8 Biomass resources 0.02 0.17 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.30 0.07
9 Deregulation 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.56 0.09 0.09 0.30 0.26
10 Democratic governor 0.00 0.15 0.31 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.21 0.14
11 Democratic representative 0.03 0.19 0.02 0.16 0.07 0.18 0.30 0.13 0.25 0.01
12 League of Conservation Voters 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.43 0.13 0.17 0.63 0.17 0.29 0.09 0.40
13 Sierra membership 0.12 0.37 0.12 0.46 0.15 0.03 0.22 0.26 0.09 0.12 0.24 0.59
14 Renewable associations 0.03 0.36 0.16 0.41 0.30 0.05 0.31 0.08 0.24 0.19 0.05 0.40 0.35
15 Percent of electricity generated from renewables 0.14 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.30 0.45 0.55
16 Emissions 0.01 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.31 0.21 0.16 0.32 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.35
17 Income per capita 0.05 0.33 0.07 0.56 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.03 0.26 0.05 0.14 0.40 0.45
18 Unemployment 0.04 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.09 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.26 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.16
19 Electricity retail price 0.09 0.21 0.09 0.43 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.37 0.42 0.04 0.39 0.51 0.47
20 Investor owned 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.00
21 Green residential customers 0.02 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.22
22 Percent of generation from fossil fuel 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.15 0.32 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.32
23 Total customers 0.41 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.08
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1 Renewable capacity
2 RPS
3 MPGO
4 Disclosure
5 Financial incentives
6 Wind resources
7 Solar resources
8 Biomass resources
9 Deregulation
10 Democratic governor
11 Democratic representative
12 League of Conservation Voters
13 Sierra membership
14 Renewable associations
15 Percent of electricity generated from renewables 0.27
16 Emissions 0.13 0.26
17 Income per capita 0.35 0.20 0.14
18 Unemployment 0.22 0.10 0.25 0.00
19 Electricity retail price 0.35 0.46 0.04 0.48 0.17
20 Investor owned 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.15
21 Green residential customers 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.01
22 Percent of generation from fossil fuel 0.02 0.24 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.02
23 Total customers 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.20 0.57 0.03 0.16
N 5807. Correlations with values equal or greater than 0.03 are significant at 5%.
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Table A5
Multinomial Logit Model of the adoption of Renewable Portfolio Standards with
and without requirements of building new capacity.
Reference group RPS without
requirement
RPS with
requirement
RPS with
requirement
No RPS No RPS RPS without
requirement
Disclosure 0.09
(1.61)
1.18
(1.00)
1.08
(1.46)
Wind resources 0.04
(0.46)
1.22**
(0.52)
1.26*
(0.76)
Solar resources 3.40***
(0.72)
0.38
(0.38)
3.02***
(0.71)
Biomass resources 13.71***
(2.88)
0.40
(0.44)
13.31***
(2.87)
Deregulation 7.01***
(2.40)
1.11
(1.00)
5.90***
(2.22)
Democratic governor 2.21
(1.73)
0.39
(0.55)
1.82
(1.60)
Democratic representative 0.04
(0.07)
0.04
(0.03)
0.08
(0.06)
League Conservation Voters 0.02
(0.09)
0.08***
(0.02)
0.06
(0.09)
Sierra membership 9.44***
(1.82)
0.38
(0.49)
9.82***
(1.82)
Renewable associations 22.27***
(5.03)
7.08***
(2.56)
15.19***
(5.31)
Percent of electricity
generated from
renewables
1.97***
(0.41)
0.10
(0.07)
1.87***
(0.41)
Emissions 10.90***
(2.10)
0.46*
(0.24)
10.44***
(2.15)
Income per capita 2.15***
(0.54)
0.11
(0.16)
2.04***
(0.55)
Unemployment 2.36**
(1.00)
1.77***
(0.42)
0.59
(1.05)
Electricity retail price 2.21***
(0.80)
0.13
(0.23)
2.33***
(0.81)
Constant 52.98***
(17.61)
24.21***
(9.24)
28.77*
(17.36)
Observations 480 480 480
Pseudo R2 0.687 0.687 0.687
Year dummies are included in all models, but are not reported.
* po0.1.
** po0.05.
*** po0.01.
Table A6
Tobit Model of Renewable Capacity (1998–2007) using enacted RPS year with and
without requirements of building new capacity.
Renewable Capacity
RSP without requirements 0.19
(0.14)
RSP with requirements 0.08
(0.07)
RSP without requirements Investor 0.42
(0.33)
RSP with requirements Investor 0.38***
(0.14)
MGPO 0.20***
(0.08)
Disclosure 0.07
(0.06)
Financial incentives 0.04
(0.04)
Wind resources 0.00
(0.01)
Solar resources 0.00
(0.01)
Biomass resources 0.03
(0.04)
Table A6 (continued )
Renewable Capacity
Deregulation 0.13
(0.08)
Democratic governor 0.00
(0.00)
Democratic representative 0.01**
(0.00)
League conservation voters 0.00
(0.00)
Sierra membership 0.10***
(0.04)
Renewable association 0.03
(0.05)
Percent of electricity generated from renewables 0.01
(0.01)
Emissions 0.01
(0.02)
Income per capita 0.01
(0.01)
Unemployment 0.02
(0.02)
Electricity retail price 0.01
(0.02)
Investor owned utilities 0.05
(0.09)
Green residential customers 0.03**
(0.01)
Percent of generation from fossil fuels 0.12*
(0.07)
Total customers 0.24**
(0.11)
Constant 0.24
(0.46)
Observations 5807
Pseudo R2 0.385
Year dummies are included in all models, but are not reported.
* po0.1.
** po0.05.
*** po0.01.
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